

BITCOINS

Reality – Fiction – Fraud: Risks & Opportunities





Bitcoin 101: technology and currency

Andrea Castillo
Technology Policy Manager
Mercatus Center at GMU



Roadmap for today

1) Distributed cash

- double spending problem
- Byzantine General's problem

2) How does it work?

- public key cryptography (wallets)
- distributed ledger of transactions (blockchain)
- distributed computer network (miners, nodes)

3) Benefits, Challenges, and Opportunities



"I've been working on a new electronic cash system that's fully peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party."

November 1, 2008



Trusted third parties are replaced by the **PROTOCOL** itself















1 BTC 1kfjdkfjsfl38 -> 1kfjdkfjsfl357583hf

3.5 BTC 1kfjdkfjsfl357583hf -> 1dfkjr83roehskfjh

2 BTC 1dfkjr83roehskfjh -> 1kfjdkfjsfl38

1 BTC 1kfjdkfjsfl38 -> 1kfjdkfjsfl357583hf

3.5 BTC 1kfjdkfjsfl357583hf -> 1dfkjr83roehskf

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1 BTC 1kfjdkfjsfl38 -> 1kfjdkfjsfl357583hf













Two barriers to direct online payments: (1) the double-spending problem and (2) the Byzantine Generals problem.



Double spending: how to achieve scarcity in a trustless environment?




The "double spending" problem

I'll email you a payment in my new e-currency, Bobgold.









Byzantine General: how to achieve consensus in a trustless environment?




The "Byzantine Generals" problem

 It is very difficult to arrive at consensus in an environment without trust.

- Coding messages only works, but only to a point
- Coordinating a true payments ledger online is open to "attack" – falsification, fraud







Bitcoin achieves digital scarcity and consensus with public key cryptography and distributed ledger-keeping (the blockchain)



Public key cryptography (Bitcoin)

- Public and private Bitcoin key like email address and password
- Gives us a way to verify identity without relying on a third party.

He who controls the private key controls the bitcoins



Distributed ledger-keeping (blockchain)


- Like BitTorrent: no one server runs/controls transfer
- Network of connected computers "p2p"
- "Nodes" running "Bitcoin" software
- What are those computers doing? Math! Validate and keep track of transfers



Mining

- Distributed computers apply processing power to solve math problems and verify blocks
- "Minting" bitcoins is the incentive
- 21 million bitcoin supply cap
- No one miner knows details of any one transaction, but all contribute to verification of ledger







ALICE'S SECRET PRIVATE KEY




Valid!

1 BTC DFLGKJSLKG -> DLFKGJSDLFG

3.5 BTC DLFKGJSDLFG -> FGGGDS

0.5 BTC FGGGDS -> DLFKGJSDLFG

1 BTC 1HneLqnWhXYe1kSXTDQay1WpdR734R2Wqy ->



BOB'S BITCOIN WALLET:

1HneLqnWhXYe1kSXTDQay1WpdR734R

2Wqy





ALICE'S BITCOIN WALLET:

1HB5XMLmzFVj8ALj6mfBsbifRoD4miY3

6v


















3.5 BTC 1kfjdkfjsfl357583hf -> 1dfkjr83roehskfjh

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What is a bitcoin?

Fundamentally, a private key

E9 87 3D 79 C6 D8 7D C0 FB 6A 57 78 63 33 89 F4 45
 32 13 30 3D A6 1F 20 BD 67 FC 23 3A A3 32 62

 A digital representation of a claim to data on the blockchain



Benefits


- Personal control a "PUSH" technology
- Exit options Greece, Argentina
- Censorship proof Wikileaks
- Affordable remittances, micropayments
- "Programmable money" smart contracts, identity,
 titling, arbitration...
 MERCATUS CENTER


 George Mason University

A balance

- The cat is out of the bag! Technology cannot be shut down (unless you shut down the Internet)
- Do not want a situation where law-abiding users cannot receive benefits, while criminals still use it for ill
- Conversations between developers, users, industry, and regulators – how to reap these benefits while addressing concerns?








September 3, 2015 Miami







Estimates used to calculate regional averages



blockchain

blockchain 2.0

The Blockchain Wars

permissioned vs. permissionless censorship-resistant vs. censorable token vs. no token financial vs. non-financial open vs. closed public vs. private

identity money sovereignty
property

PARADIGMS questioned

security governance

law regulation

RETHINK REDEFINE REINVENT

Risks & Rewards

Santander: Blockchain Tech Can Save Banks \$20 Billion a Year

Yessi Bello Perez (@yessi_kbello) | Published on June 16, 2015 at 12:15 BST

NEWS



684

f 310

g+ 31

in 244



0



Blockchain technologies could reduce banks' infrastructural costs by \$15-20bn a year by 2022, a new report from Santander InnoVentures claims.

The FinTech 2.0 Paper, produced in collaboration with Oliver Wyman and Anthemis Group, says distributed ledger technology could save banks money by eliminating central authorities and bypassing slow, expensive payment networks.



Beyond payments, its authors identify other areas of potential for distributed ledgers, noting:

Potential Benefits

- Reduced physical infrastructure
- Coordination via one distributed database
- Fewer front and back office inefficiencies
- Real-time Settlement / No commitment Risk
- Real-time auditing
- Some uses: settlement, custody, IPO & debt issuance, OTC collateral, margining, repo

Blockchain R&D

RBS & CBA Ripple trial Citi Blockchain Initiative **UBS** Blockchain initiative Barclays Lab + partnership with Safello LHV Bank (Estonia) issuing receivables via colored coins HSBC Innovation Lab SWIFT Blockchain research challenge NASDAQ IBM Blockchain Initiative

IBM-Samsung IoT Partnership ING, ABN Amro, Rabobank Deloitte, EY, PwC Fidor Bank Ripple integration CIBC pilot projects Honduras real estate records Greek Island gold-backed cryptocurrency UK research and state support NYSE, USAA, BBVA investments USAA blockchain research



"You should be taking blockchain technology as seriously as you should have been taking the development of the Internet in the early 1990s."







Roadmap to Implementing Bitcoins and Cryptocurrencies

Richard Forsyth, JD/MBA CEO – Alitin, Inc. raforsyth@alitin.com

































NININA DIGITAL ARMS RACE






























The Internet of Money























Change is Hard.

So what?











Roadmap to Implementing Bitcoins and Cryptocurrencies

Richard Forsyth, JD/MBA CEO – Alitin, Inc. raforsyth@alitin.com

Opportunities Regulation of Bitcoin & Cryptocurrencies

digital currency virtual currency crypto-assets

Risks & Stakeholders

Risk Areas

- operational
- credit
- money laundering
- terrorist financing
- information loss
- Liquidity
- fraud
- identity theft

Stakeholders

- federal agencies
- state agencies
- investors
- consumers
- employees
- society

Goals

- safety
- soundness
- security
- privacy
- crime prevention
- health
- integrity

Regulation -> Inevitable, yet valid Compliance -> Onerous, yet valuable

Smart Entrepreneurs Enlightened Policy-makers, Regulators, Leaders

KNOW IT WORK TOGETHER FOCUS ON THE GOALS

Reasons for Regulating Financial Intermediaries

CONSUMER PROTECTION

ML & TF PREVENTION

SYSTEMIC RISKS

TAXATION

Bitcoin -> Regulated Before Born

"transmission of money or value"

"cash or monetary equivalent"

"value that substitutes for currency"

Financial Intermediaries Risk Areas

Anti-Money Laundering (AML)

Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT)

Privacy and Information Security (InfoSec)

Safety and soundness (S&S)

Consumer disclosures & support (CP)

Anonymity = Anathema

- Anonymous identification
- No value limits
- Anonymous funding
- No transaction records
- Wide geographical use
- No usage limits

Cash features

FATE Report on New Payment Methods (2006)



Anonymous Untraceable

"Invisible to law enforcement and the taxman"

enhanced surveillance and control

Consumer "Advisories"

Lebanon, Germany, Hong Kong, Belgium, Indonesia, UK, Russia, Estonia, US-WI, Greece, Israel, Brazil, Philippines, US-TX, Germany, US-CA, US-NV, Canada, US-ID, US-SEC, US-IN, US-NM, Europe-CB, Argentina, US-ME, Netherlands, Russia, US-MI, France, Japan, Australia, UK, Serbia, Portugal, Norway, France, Canada, Ireland

Scheme governance authority

Customer due diligence (CDD) requirements

Fitness and probity standards

Mandatory incorporation

Transparent price formation and requirements against market abuse

Authorisation and corporate governance

Capital requirements

Separation of client accounts

Evidence of secure IT systems

Payment guarantees and refunds

Separation of VC schemes from conventional payment schemes

Reporting and other requirements

Clear and transparent regulation

A global regulatory approach

Risk drivers s. and t. remain deliberately unaddressed

no authority that could provide exchange rate stability and/or act as the redeemer of last resort

t. No stabilising authority

merchants are not legally required to accept a particular (or any) VC and can switch between different VC schemes

s. Not legal tender

VC units and FC funds can be exchanged easily, therefore creating spill-over effects or risks from VC to FC systems

r. Interconnectedness to FC

lack of reporting requirements to any authority, e.g. of suspicious transactions

q. No reporting

lack of skills, expertise, systems , controls, organisational structure and governance exercised by market participants

p. Lack of corporate capacity and governance

2014 EBA Opinion

POTENTIAL REGULATORY APPROACH

2014
European Banking Authority
Opinion on Virtual Currency
RISK DRIVERS

 a. VC schemes can be created (and their functioning subsequently changed) by anyone, anonymously

Anyone can anonymously create a VC and can subseque make changes to the VC protocol or other core compoif the required majority of (anonymous) miners agree.

b. Payer and payee are anonymous

Transmitters and recipients of VCs interact on a person-to-person basis but remain anonymous.

c. Global reach

the internet-based nature of VC schemes does not respect national and, therefore, jurisdictional boundaries

d. Lack of probity

exchange is neither audited nor subject to governance and probity standards, and is subject to misappropriation, fraud and seizure

e. Not a legal person

market participants are not incorporated as entities that could be subjected to standards

f. Opaque price formation

price formation on exchanges is not transparent and is not subject to reliable standards, and exchange rates differ significantly between exchanges, which facilitates manipulation of exchanges

g. No refunds or payment guarantee

VC transactions are not reversible, so no refunds are issued for erroneous transactions

h. Unclear regulation

the regulatory treatment is unclear and creates uncertainty for market participants

i. Lack of definitions and standards

the features of a product can be misrepresented because of a lack of definitions and standards

j. Inadequate IT safety

the IT systems, infrastructure, transaction ledger, VC protocol and encryption are either insecure, subject to fraud and manipulation, and, in the case of the protocol, can be changed through a majority of miners

k. Information is neither objective nor equally distributed

limited availability of comprehensible, independent and objective information on VC activities. As a result, some market participants benefit from information inequality, e.g. on events that influence p formation

Regulatory Arbitrage

conservative vs. progressive aggressive vs. permissive formal vs. substantial restrictive vs. expansive misguided vs. enlightened

Thank You

